Name: Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure? (en Inglés)
Price: 102783.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col
ISBN: 9781500721893

portada Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure? (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Editorial

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.3 cm

Peso

0.15 kg.

ISBN13

9781500721893

Categorías

Ciencias políticas

Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure? (en Inglés)

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col (Autor) · Createspace Independent Publishing Platform · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

$ 102.783

$ 158.128

Ahorras: $ 55.345

35% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Martes 30 de Julio y el Jueves 08 de Agosto.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Colombia entre 1 y 5 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure? (en Inglés)"

Coercion theory centers on an actor's ability to influence the decision making of an opponent. This monograph examines military operations in Libya 2011, Operations Unified Protector and Odyssey Dawn, through the lens of coercion theory. It seeks to answer the question: if the United States and its allies attempted to apply coercion theory against Gaddafi preceding and during military operations, why did he seemingly exhibit no behavioral changes prior to his death? This monograph purports that even though Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector succeeded in supporting the removal of the Gaddafi regime, ultimately they represent a coercive failure. The military operations in Libya in 2011 illustrate several central tenets of coercion theory. First, in order for coercion to be possible, the stated desired behavioral change must actually be intended. Furthermore, coercive demands must contain a plausible way out. Also, national and coalition objectives and agendas must be thoroughly enumerated and accounted for. Most importantly, whereas coercion theory provides military planners an excellent starting point for asking relevant questions, it cannot serve as a formulaic overlay to inherently complex and unfamiliar situations.