Name: Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Deposit Insurance Reform, Funding Manager Decisions a (en Inglés)
Price: 70264.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: Covitz, Daniel M. ; United States Federal Reserve Board ; Et Al
ISBN: 9781288715558

portada Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Deposit Insurance Reform, Funding Manager Decisions a (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

United States Federal Reserve Board

Daniel M. Covitz

Editorial

Bibliogov

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

24.6 x 18.9 x 0.2 cm

Peso

0.09 kg.

ISBN13

9781288715558

Categorías

Política y gobierno

Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Deposit Insurance Reform, Funding Manager Decisions a (en Inglés)

United States Federal Reserve Board (Autor) · Daniel M. Covitz (Autor) · Bibliogov · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Deposit Insurance Reform, Funding Manager Decisions a (en Inglés)"

This paper demonstrates that the risk sensitivity of a banking organization's subordinated debt yield spreads may understate the potential for market discipline in some periods and overstate in others because such spreads contain liquidity premiums that are driven, in part, by the risk-sensitivity of funding manager decisions. Once such decisions are accounted for, new evidence is provided that indicates that subordinated debt spreads were sensitive to organization-specific risks in the mid-1980s, and that the risk- sensitivity of such spreads was about the same in the pre- and post-FDICIA periods. These results resolve some anomalies in the existing literature. In addition, it is argued that mandating the regular issuance of subordinated debt would, by reducing the endogeneity of liquidity premiums, improve the information content of both primary and secondary market debt spreads, thereby augmenting both direct and indirect market discipline.