Name: Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and Lessons for the Future: Nsiad-93-40 (en Inglés)
Price: 85483.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: U. S. Government Accountability Office (
ISBN: 9781289242589

portada Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and Lessons for the Future: Nsiad-93-40 (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Bibliogov

Autor

U. S. Government Accountability Office (

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

24.6 x 18.9 x 0.3 cm

Peso

0.11 kg.

ISBN13

9781289242589

Categorías

Política y gobierno

Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and Lessons for the Future: Nsiad-93-40 (en Inglés)

U. S. Government Accountability Office ( (Autor) · Bibliogov · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and Lessons for the Future: Nsiad-93-40 (en Inglés)"

GAO reviewed the Air Mobility Command's (AMC) achievements in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. GAO found that: (1) AMC maintained continuous airlift operations from the United States to Saudi Arabia from the first day of Desert Shield deployment; (2) AMC averaged 65 missions per day from August 7, 1990, to November 1990; (3) AMC averaged 125 missions per day when hostilities began with Desert Storm; (4) AMC access to off-load locations was more limited in the initial months of Desert Shield than expected; (5) large backlogs of sustainment cargo caused legitimate high-priority cargo to be delayed at AMC aerial ports of embarkation; (6) additional off-load locations were made available to AMC through political negotiations and physical improvements to facilities in Saudi Arabia; (7) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command sent representatives to major AMC ports of embarkation to reduce the large backlogs and speed the delivery of sustainment cargo; (8) the Central Command's allocation of airlift cargo capacity imposed a degree of discipline on the transportation and supply requisition systems and made field commanders and supply units aware of the limited availability of airlift cargo; (9) AMC required reserve augmentation earlier than envisioned and relied heavily on reserve volunteers for the 3 weeks prior to the presidential call-up due to the lack of an in-theater recovery base; and (10) the Air Force called up its reserves by subunits or skill categories rather than as whole units.