Name: Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology (en Inglés)
Price: 481587.00 COP
Availability: InStock
Author: McCain, Kevin ; Moretti, Luca
ISBN: 9780192896872

portada Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Kevin McCain

Luca Moretti

Editorial

Oxford University Press, USA

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

208

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

23.6 x 16.3 x 1.6 cm

Peso

0.45 kg.

ISBN13

9780192896872

Categorías

Tradiciones y escuelas de pensamiento
Epistemología y teoría del conocimiento
Filosofía de la mente

Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology (en Inglés)

Kevin McCain (Autor) · Luca Moretti (Autor) · Oxford University Press, USA · Tapa Dura

Libro Físico

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Reseña del libro "Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology (en Inglés)"

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that things are a particular way gives one prima facie justification for believing that they are that way) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is immune to some of these problems, but not all. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one's evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls.